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Abstract 
Institutional apologies for historical injustices can be conceived as acts of symbolic 
inclusion directed to people whose collective experiences and memories of the past 
have not been recognized in the hegemonic narratives of the past. However, in this 
article it is argued that such apologies also have exclusionary potential as vehicles of 
symbolic politics of citizenship in that they may designate the apologizing community 
so that it effectively excludes cultural ‘aliens’, like migrants, from the community of 
‘remedial’ citizens. The article suggests a crucial point is the rhetoric shifts when one 
is appealing to both cultural and political solidarity, as when apologizing in the name 
of the state but simultaneously invoking ‘our’ nation and ‘our’ history. Thus the 
increasing number of institutional historical apologies is not necessarily incompatible 
with the trend of reinforcing the symbolic boundaries around ‘our’ historical-cultural 
communities that has been visible recently, for example, in the demands for cultural 
canons and citizenship tests in many Western societies.  
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
On 6 November 1942 eight Jewish refugees were deported from Finland and handed 
over to German authorities. Finland was at that historical moment an ally to Germany 
in war against the Soviet Union.1 During the war German political leaders posed their 
Finnish counterparts tentative questions concerning ‘the Jewish question in Finland’, 
but the Finnish Government evaded the issue with a denial that there was any ‘Jewish 
question’. The number of native Finnish Jews was comparatively small, amounting to 
c. 2000 people in the 1930’s. In addition c. 500 Jewish refugees from Central Europe, 
mostly from Germany and Austria, came to Finland after 1938. Many of them would 
continue to Sweden but at least 150 stayed in Finland also during the Finnish-German 
alliance, and one estimate suggests the number of Jewish refugees remaining in 
Finland in 1941–44 exceeded 350. (Illman & Harviainen 1988, 140–141; Rautkallio 
2004, 325–333, 442–453.) Despite the German authorities’ occasional suggestions to 
have the refugees expelled they stayed in Finland throughout the war. In 1942, 
however, as a result of a high level Finnish Secret Police initiative eight Jewish 
refugees held in custody were expelled. The Government was divided on the issue but 
allowed the deportation. Having fallen in German hands the refugees were transported 
to concentration camps; only one of them would survive the war. (Rautkallio 2004.)  
 
On 5 November 2000 a monument was unveiled in Helsinki, Finland, to honour the 
memory of the deported. The then Prime Minister of The Republic of Finland, Mr. 
Paavo Lipponen, spoke at the ceremony: 
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‘Delivering the eight Jewish refugees into the hands of Nazi-Germany in 1942 
was a shameful moment in Finnish history. The deed can not be undone, nor 
can it be explained away by using circumstances as an excuse [...] It was a 
decision by the Finnish Government. On behalf of the Finnish Government and 
all the Finnish people I apologize for it to the Jewish community [...] As the 
most hideous of horrendous acts the genocide of Jews and, with them, many 
other oppressed people has not faded in our minds. The new generation must be 
told about the Holocaust always when also the glorious history of the 
Fatherland is spoken of.’2 
 
I definitely find the Prime Minister’s words sympathetic but there is an ambiguity that 
is interesting from the perspective of what implications the apology he made has for 
demarcating the limits of the community on whose behalf the apology is was made. 
Historical apologies by institutional actors can often be conceived as acts of symbolic 
inclusion, but in this paper I suggest they also have potential to symbolic exclusion: 
they may also designate the ‘penitent community’ so that it effectively excludes 
cultural ‘aliens’ from the community of ‘remedial’ citizens. The corollary is that 
symbolic historical reparations like apologies by institutional actors may serve as 
vehicles not only for inclusionary but exclusionary politics of cultural citizenship. 
 
Historical apologies as acts of symbolic inclusion and recognition 
 
In the last fifteen years there has been an expanding amount of literature on the issue 
of reparing historical injustices. The preferred terminology has varied, some authors 
preferring the use of ‘restitution’, some other the use of ‘reparation’, as the general 
term for measures of redressing past injustices. Here I use ‘reparation’ as the generic 
term that also includes symbolic redress like historical apologies by state institutions. 
(On the terminology see, Torpey 2006, 42–49.) 
 
The analyses of the historical apologies trend at the turn of the Millennium have also 
discussed how to interpret or explain the rise of apologies. Models of explanation are 
many, ranging from those focusing on the replacement of future-oriented grand 
projects type socialism with particularistic identity projects of more limited political 
expectations (Torpey 2006), to those discussing the ‘transformation of temporality 
and historicity’ that is tied up with the decline of the nation-state (Olick & Coughlin 
2003), and to those that identify a new emphasis on morality in international politics 
after the wave of democratic transitions around the world (Barkan 2003). However 
one factor that almost all the analyses see as having conduced to the development is 
the increased political mobilization and visibility of minorities and oppressed groups 
wanting to have justice to their collective memories and experiences of the past.  
 
Elazar Barkan has offered a succinct formulation when describing the negotiations on 
reparation (in Barkan’s terminology, ‘restitutions’) for past injustices as a process 
where groups of people ‘barter histories and national memories for recognition and 
material resources’ (Barkan 2001, 345). More accurately, it is a process where the 
claimants demand recognition of the experiences and memories of loss and pain that 
are formative of their collective identity and their ‘own history’. Repairing material 
losses can be a substantial issue but often the point of primary significance to the 
claimants has been recognition for the narrative of their suffering which has been 
marginalized in, or excluded from the hegemonic accounts of the past. Negotiating 
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reparation for the past injustices is a process where the subjectivities of the victims are 
being (re)produced by way of (re)constructing and manifesting painful collective 
memories. In some cases the reparation claims may entail a demand for the 
recognition of the very existence of the victimized group as a distinct collective. For 
example, in the debates on the Armenian massacres of the 1910’s and 1920’s the 
unwillingness of the state of Turkey to consider symbolic reparation like apology has 
been due partly to reluctance to signal that there might be a distinct ethnic entity like 
the Armenians within the territory of the Turkish state. The claimants, on their part, 
would appreciate a symbolic reparation as a recognition of the committed injustice 
and, importantly, as a recognition of the Armenians as an ethnic entity. (See, Bloxham 
2005, 207–233.) 
 
The keyword here is recognition: recognition of collective experiences and memories 
and the historical and cultural identities based on them. As Nancy Fraser has pointed 
out, one of the developments in the late 20th century political discourses has been the 
rise of a new ‘grammar of political claims-making’ (Fraser 1997) whereby the focus 
of debates has moved further from the issues of redistribution of resources and toward 
the issues of recognition, the latter pertaining to questions of status parity in society’s 
institutionalized patterns of cultural values, for example. The ‘politics of recognition’, 
as also Fraser has noted, has often tended to merge with the ‘politics of identity’ 
which hinges upon essentialising presumptions of group identities based on shared 
experiences (Fraser 2000). More particularly, these reconstructed shared experiences 
have often been experiences of oppression. For example, for certain streams of the 
early gay and lesbian movement the recovery of the ‘untold story’ of the homosexual 
experience of oppression in the past and a public recognition of this historical 
injustice was an empowering idea as the movement fought for gay and lesbian social 
and political rights (See, Weeks 1985, 185–201). 
 
The significance of historical reparation like institutional apologies or memorial days 
lies in their capacity to serve as acts of symbolic inclusion, directed to people whose 
collective memories and experiences of loss have been omitted from the standard 
accounts of the past and, thus, whose historical and cultural identities have not been 
acknowledged as legitimate or relevant to society. The reparative act acknowledges 
the place of such memories in the narrative of the (national) past and the legitimacy of 
the victims’ identity in the wider (national) social framework. 
 
The potential of historical apologies to generate symbolic inclusion and reconciliation 
within communities has been the focus of numerous studies. For example, Melissa 
Nobles’ study of the apology cases in Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the United 
States also discusses state apologies as vehicles for reshaping ‘the meanings and terms 
of national membership’, i.e. the symbolic contents and the boundaries of the national 
communities (Nobles 2008; see also the articles in Gibney & al. 2008 and Barkan & 
Karn 2006). There is one analytic perspective, however, missing in these studies that I 
find relevant. Let us look at an illustrative phrase: in his study of historical redress 
politics in Canada, Matt James concludes: ‘...redress politics appears to be forging a 
new discursive context in which the beneficiaries and the victims of historical 
injustice can begin meaningfully to discuss their joint histories and future’ (James 
2006, 246, italics mine). The focus is on what apologies ‘do’ to the victims and to the 
relationship between the victims and the perpetrators/beneficiaries, for example by 
giving new self-respect to the victims and confirming their symbolic inclusion in the 
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national community. What is missing, however, is an analysis of how the apology 
affects the position of those who are, for all practical purposes, members of the 
apologizing state (her citizens) but who will identify with neither the (heirs of the) 
victims nor with the (heirs of the) perpetrators.  
 
In his seminal study on the sociology of apology, Nicholas Tavuchis suggested that 
apologies are dyadic, involving two parties (the victim and the perpetrator), but the 
‘third parties’ also have some importance in the process of apologizing, for example 
as ‘judges’, ‘witnesses’ or as audience whose reactions have relevance to the public 
image and credibility of the two main parties (Tavuchis 1991, 46–54). Tavuchis does 
not go into how the apologies redesign the symbolic boundaries of the communities of 
the offended and the offenders, but it is relevant also to pose the question about the 
community-demarcating effects of the historical apologies in regard to how they may 
shape the boundaries of the ‘culpable’ community vis-à-vis the ‘third’ party. As we 
will see, this issue can be relevant for the migrant population, for example. 
 
At this point, it is useful to pause to consider the politics of apologies, and more 
generally the politics of history, as a form of politics of cultural citizenship.  
 
Politics of history as politics of cultural citizenship 
 
Considering that historical reparations always at some level entail a vindication of the 
memories and narratives that are constitutive of the victims’ collective and individual 
identities, one can suggest that the new concern for the issues of historical reparation 
in the last 15–20 years intertwines closely with the rise of a notion of citizenship that 
emphazises the cultural dimension of citizenship, as distinct from the legal and socio-
economic ones. Already in 1997 Jan Pakulski noted that the discourses of citizenship 
were expanding into a field that can be characterized as issues of cultural citizenship: 
cultural visibility, right to dignified representation, and support to particular cultural 
identities and life-styles (Pakulski 1997). As for example Gerard Delanty (2002) has 
pointed out, it has often been unclear in the debates whether ‘cultural citizenship’ is 
defined via cultural rights and how these relate to the issue of minority rights, or how 
‘cultural citizenship’ addresses individual cultural needs or inclusion of the excluded. 
However, the discourse of cultural citizenship has been a positive innovation in that it 
has drawn attention to the respect for people’s cultural (and historical) identity as one 
of the prerequisites for ‘full-scale’ citizenship. Since symbolic representations have an 
important role in shaping social relations it can be argued that cultural rights are, in a 
sense, expanded social rights (cf. Delanty 2002, 65; Stevenson 2003, 10–18).  
 
Historical apologies are politics of history in that they contribute to the construction of 
the public view of the past. They are also politics of cultural citizenship as they entail 
recognition of injustices that are often significant to the identity and self-perception of 
the victims. In this respect, they can serve inclusionary purposes; historical apologies 
for the previously unacknowledged suffering are to the victims a confirmation of their 
symbolic inclusion in the (national or other) community – their painful memories are 
institutionally incorporated in ‘our shared memory’ and ‘our  history’. Examples are 
numerous, ranging from the US apology for detaining the American-Japanese during 
WW II (Barkan 2001, 30–45) to the apology by President Kwasniewski, in 2001, for 
the persecution of Jewish Poles by their fellow countrymen during WW II (Tymowski 
2002).3  
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But politics of cultural citizenship may also have an exclusionary flavour. Already in 
1995, Verena Stolcke identified a trend that she called a ‘new rhetorics of exclusion’, 
a discourse that essentializes cultural differences between ethnic groups and regards 
them as an insurmountable obstacle to a harmonious multi-ethnic society (Stolcke 
1995). ‘Proper’ citizenship is thereby connected to possession of particular cultural 
heritage. One may argue that in many Occidental societies today this view echoes, for 
example, in the demands for citizenship tests and educational programs where 
migrants are to learn the cultural ‘canon’ and the history of their new resident country 
(see, Grever 2007). Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka have been cautiously optimistic 
that such a ‘retreat from multiculturalism’ may be an overstatement since legislation 
on the civic and social rights of immigrants in many societies has not been altered that 
much even if anti-immigration rhetorics has turned more hostile (Banting & Kymlicka 
2006). Yet for example Han Entzinger (2006) suggests otherwise for the Netherlands, 
and also David Miller points out that the apparently ‘merely’ rhetorical shifts in the 
discourses of multiculturalism may have very real political effects (Miller 2006, 335; 
see also, Isin & Turner 2007, 9–12; Joppke 2007). 
 
For example, the exercise material for the UK citizenship test, Life in the UK Test 
(2007) poses practice questions on the history of immigration to the UK where the 
right options implicitly create a picture of the UK as a haven for the oppressed of the 
world (e.g. pages 9, 27, 45, 69, 81 and 87). The ‘right’ answers can be supported with 
historical evidence, however as historical interpretations they are simplifications that 
focus on some explanatory factor only. Considering that the alien’s prospects of being 
granted citizenship depend on how she scores in the test, there is a close connection 
between her prospective legal civic status and her adhering to a particular view of 
history: her naturalization depends in part on knowing the ‘right’ interpretation of the 
national past. Of course, memorizing a particular account of the past when preparing 
for a citizenship test (or any other examination) is not to say it will be an internalized 
element of the person’s historical consciousness, yet the message is that the ‘proper’ 
citizens endorse that account. Thus ‘history’ is mobilized for the purposes of 
designating the criteria of citizenship, and politics of history merges with politics of 
cultural citizenship, with a potentially exclusionary effect. (As example see also, 
Lomsky-Feder & Rapoport 2008.) 
 
This brings us to where we started the discussion, with Finnish Prime Minister at the 
monument for the deported Jewish refugees in Helsinki on a November day 2000. 
 
The exclusionary potential of historical apologies 
 
I do not doubt the good intentions in Prime Minister Lipponen’s words quoted at the 
beginning of this text, but I want to argue that in the rhetorics he used he implicitly 
ended up demarcating the premises of Finnish citizenship in a way that carries a clear 
element of cultural exclusiveness in it – something that the speaker probably did not 
quite intend.  
 
Prime Minister’s words imply a moral obligation to the members of the community of 
‘Finnish people’ to take responsibility for the actions of the political representatives of 
the nation in 1942 and to partake in the act of symbolic reparation, i.e. the institutional 
apology. The significant passage in Prime Minister’s speech is, ‘On behalf of [...] all 
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the Finnish people I apologize’. Mr. Lipponen also refers to the Finnish Government 
as the agent of action in 1942 (‘It was a decision of the Finnish Government’) and in 
2000 (‘On behalf of the Finnish Government [...] I apologize’). Here the burden of the 
morally reprehensible past seems to be placed on the Finnish people as a political 
community: those exhorted to partake in the apology are people on whose behalf the 
Government in parliamentary democracy is entitled to speak and who, as consenting 
citizens, are co-responsible for the Government’s action, be it in 2000 (apology) or in 
1942 (deportation of the refugees). Obviously there is a presupposition here that the 
collective ‘Finnish people’ has historical continuity that makes it sensible to speak of 
her transgenerational responsibility and to suggest that the ‘Finnish people’ today bear 
moral responsibility also for the painful chapters of Finnish history sixty years earlier. 
I do not find that objectionable, but I think the problem in Prime Minister’s address is 
his conflation of political and cultural communities. 
 
In the final part of Prime Minister’s speech we see that the symbolic amend does not 
speak of the moral obligations of Finnish people as a political community only; there 
is a line pregnant with cultural meanings, namely a reference to the ‘glorious history 
of the Fatherland’ and how it should be told also to future generations. Here, Prime 
Minister ends up making a rhetoric gesture that obliges first and foremost – or only? – 
‘Finnish people’ as a cultural community, i.e. a community of those who experience 
that they are share-holders in the (‘glorious’) narrative of the Finnish history where 
also year 1942 is ‘history of the Fatherland’ and a reference point of one’s historical 
identity.  
 
It is important to note that Finnish national identity has been characterized by a strong 
historical component: the history of the Finnish nation-state has been one of the major 
constitutive elements of national self-understanding. Particularly years 1939–44, with 
two successive wars against the Soviet Union and one against Nazi-Germany, were a 
formative collective experience that would be summoned up and recalled in numerous 
films and novels and, to some extent, in family tradition also decades afterwards. Still 
at the turn of the Millennium the story about the ‘battle of national survival’ was the 
key narrative of Finnish history among the adolescents and an important element of 
their historical identity (Ahonen 1998). To the Finnish people at large the history of 
Finland has been a source of powerful images of national community and national 
destiny, a ‘history of the Fatherland’.  
 
The apology by Mr. Lipponen was commented spearsely but positively in the media. 
For example, the leading daily paper, Helsingin Sanomat, wrote that referring to the 
deportation as a ‘shameful moment in Finnish history’ was pretty strong, considering 
that the Jewish citizens of Finland had lived safe also during the war and that the fate 
of the deported was ‘only a little detail’ in the tragedy of the Holocaust, however the 
deportation had been inhuman and cruel, hence the apology was appropriate and also 
the attribute ‘shameful’ was well motivated (Helsingin Sanomat, November 7, 2000). 
The paucity of media and other public reactions to Mr. Lipponen’s apology in mind, it 
is noteworthy that three years later a journalistic documentary book, Luovutetut (The 
Relinquished) triggered a lively debate, arguing that Finland had been implicated in 
the Holocaust much more deeply; the claim was based on the author’s calculations 
that Finland had handed over to Germans nearly 3000 prisoners of war, mostly ethnic 
Russian many of whom would perish in German hands (Sana 2003). The figures were 
not exactly a novelty but the crux of the matter was that the book explicitly called into 
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question the narrative of ‘the morally immaculate nation in a non-ideological war of 
self-defence’ that had been an essential element of the national imagery (see, Tilli 
2007). Apparently the apology by the Prime Minister, in 2000, did not entail as 
powerful a challenge to the foundational national myths, hence it did not raise that 
much public discussion. 
 
I believe the intended message of Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen in his address was 
that the Finnish Government and the Finnish people want to take moral responsibility 
for the 1942 tragedy because there is a historical continuity of the state and the nation 
which obliges the present-day community of Finnish citizens and her political 
representatives. However, the final note in Prime Minister’s address invokes the 
image of ‘our shared memory’ of the national past and, I would argue, it implies that 
the possession of such memory demarcates the moral community that is the subject of 
the apology, i.e. the ‘Finnish people’. Hereby the door is open wide for the 
conclusion: if you wish to be part of the community of the Finnish people you should 
feel morally obliged to partake in the apology, and if you can not share this sentiment, 
you can not be regarded as a member of this moral and cultural community. The crux 
of the matter is the shift in how the Prime Minister invokes the political community of 
Finnish citizens and the cultural community of Finnish people as if interchangeables. 
This creates a problem. 
 
‘Nations’ and the inseparable political and cultural solidarity 
 
In his ceremonial apology, Prime Minister Lipponen was addressing two overlapping 
communities: the community of those with the sense of sharing particular memories 
of the national past, and the community of those who have invested Prime Minister 
with power to stand as their representative in parliamentary democracy. The first can 
be called a cultural and the latter a political community. One can distinguish the two 
analytically but in the lived everyday-life they may be difficult to separate. 
 
In a world of nation-states it makes sense to regard nations as political communities, 
however nations are an outcome of processes of nation-building where cultural issues 
like historical identification and collective memories and traditions play an important 
role. This applies even in cases like France or the US where the rhetorics of national 
self-identification is strongly hinged upon an idea of shared civic principles (liberty, 
egalitarianism) but there is also a powerful integrating narrative of ‘our nation’ and 
her cultural traditions, embodied in particular icons, celebrations, memorials and other 
lieux de mémoire. Thus also in these societies the symbolic constitution of ‘proper’ 
citizenship is not unaffected by the question of one’s relationship to what is conceived 
as part of the ‘national heritage’. (See e.g. Sa’adah 2003, 91–93; Zelinsky 1988, 232–
245). This inescapable cultural dimension of political communities is relevant also to 
the discussion on institutional historical apologies.  
 
Janna Thompson has provided a sophisticated philosophical analysis on why one can 
speak of transgenerational responsibility and moral obligation to historical reparation. 
She uses the term ‘nations’ in the meaning ‘political agent[s] capable of making and 
keeping agreements’; the nations have continuity over generations, and if you wish to 
be part of the nation, you also have to take responsibility for her commitments in the 
past, i.e. commitments of those who wielded power in her name. In Thompson’s view, 
to be a member of a nation predicates that one recognizes shared responsibility for the 
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nation’s past and concedes to the eventual claims of historical reparation placed at the 
nation’s door. In fact, only nations have the kind of capacity to make agreements and 
exist continuously over generations which makes them liable to repare past injustices. 
Thompson admits though that such continuity may break, for example, when there is 
a radical change in the political system and people reasonably can not be considered 
to have consented to the politics of the former administration. (Thompson 2002, 72, 
74–77.) 
 
Thompson conceives the ‘nation’ only as a political community (‘A nation [...] is a 
political society – not a cultural or religious group’, p. 5). She mentions there have 
been ‘radical doubts’ on the question ‘about the persistence of national identity’, but 
she reformulates this as a ‘problem of establising political identity’ (p. 73). In my 
view Thompson here does not pay due attention to the cultural components of the 
‘nations’ and to the implications they may have for the politics of citizenship in the 
context of historical apologies.4 
  
Political communities are historically and culturally constructed with help of symbols 
and images; a ‘pure’ political community devoid of cultural content is 
anthropologically and sociologically not convincing. Also to Thompson the political 
community par excellence seems to be the nation-state, but one may argue that being 
a member of the nation-state is also not merely equivalent to obeying her laws, 
accepting the legitimacy of her political-administrative institutions, or deploying the 
resources of formal civic participation; it is also very much loyalty to particular 
(invented) traditions and sharing particular (mythical) narratives associated with the 
nation-state. In a phenomenology-inspired reading, Danielle Celermajer has suggested 
‘the nation is the political realm where ich meine Dasein habe – I have my 
being/place of Being’, Dasein being equivalent to the ‘moral/cultural/political world 
that is the source of individual and national identity’ and where values develope and 
feelings like shame for the nation’s past may come to propel political action such as 
apologies (Celermajer 2006, 166–167). 
 
Conceiving the ‘nation’ as a purely political community Thompson argues that also 
immigrants, as citizens of their new country of residence, have a moral obligation to 
shoulder the nation’s historical culpability also when they have not been part of the 
‘nation’ at the time the wrong was committed (Thompson 2002, 36). This view may 
be well-grounded as formal philosophical reasoning on the obligations of political 
citizens, but anthropologically and sociologically the point of importance is that it is 
unlikely that the migrant at a subjective level will feel responsible for the historical 
moral burdens of her new resident country, and also Thompson admits this in passing 
(p. 36). There is a distinction between what we can call political and cultural 
solidarity, a distinction that Paul Ricoeur pointed out in his discussion on the 
phenomenology of historical apology:  
 
‘The paradox is that institutions have no moral conscience and that it is their 
representatives, speaking in their name, that confer on them something like a 
proper name and, with it, historical guilt. Certain members of the communities 
involved can, nevertheless, not feel personally concerned by a cultural solidarity 
that possesses a force different from the political solidarity from which the 
collective responsibility [...] results.’ (Ricoeur 2004, 479.) 
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Thus Ricoeur identifies the sentiment of cultural solidarity as a condition for deeper 
sentiments of co-responsibility for historical culpability. In Ricoeurian terminology 
one can say that when Janna Thompson speaks of the responsibility of the migrant to 
participate in historical reparation she takes into consideration only political but not 
cultural solidarity, and the two are not necessarily identical but potentially tensious. 
She fails to consider that official reparative acts by the state for historical injustices 
are not only a statement on the moral obligations of political citizens but a statement 
on how people in the community should feel about ‘our past’. Historical apologies are 
pregnant with cultural meaning, and it is likely that the sentiment of committed moral 
co-responsibility will not follow from a sense of belonging in a pure political entity 
but rather from a sense of belonging in a collective of shared traditions and memories, 
as also Thompson indirectly admits (p. 73). My critique of Thompson at this point is 
essentially the same as the critique levelled against Jürgen Habermas for his ignoring 
the issue of the construction of cultural identity as a meaningful part of the issue of 
constituting a civil society (see, Stevenson 2003, 18–25). Political solidarity alone, as 
a ground for supporting historical apologies, is likely to result in apologies appearing 
as merely ‘cheap talk’ within the institutional realm of the state, and the credibility of 
the apology largely depends on the mobilization of sentiments in civil society where 
the ‘passionate encounters’ at issues of civic values (cf. Stevenson 2003, 24) are 
fuelled by competing loyalties to cultural and historical traditions, symbols and codes. 
 
As the quote from the apology by the Finnish Prime Minister shows, the discourses of 
political solidarity and cultural solidarity may easily appear side by side and slide into 
each other as they are invoked one after the other. The demands for political solidarity 
are fairly unproblematic as they are basically demands to the members of the polity to 
accept the legitimacy of the political order and the right of the political leader to speak 
in the name of the community. Cultural solidarity, however, implies a sense of sharing 
at a deeper level of memory and tradition that is more difficult to muster and, indeed, 
may be inaccessible to citizens with different cultural background. Hence the demand 
for cultural solidarity implicit in the institutional apologies for the nation’s historical 
burdens may effectively set the parametres of ‘proper’ citizenship so that it excludes 
cultural ‘aliens’ from the civic community. 
 
The problem in the Finnish Prime Minister’s speech may appear rather innocent, but 
the issue of exclusionary politics of cultural citizenship through politics of history is 
very much present and actual in the contemporary world in other similar situations of 
dealing with the (painful) national past, as the next chapter aims to show. 
 
Migrants, the Holocaust, and German civic identity 
 
Studying the historical identity of the German youth with migrant background Viola 
Georgi has focused, inter alia, on whether the young find points of identification in 
German history and what is the place of the Holocaust in their historical identity and 
historical consciousness. She reports an interesting incident on a visit that a group of 
students made to the former concentration camp of Terezin (Theresienstadt). Georgi 
interviewed a student of Turkish background, Bülent, on his experience of the visit. 
When in the crematorium of the camp, some German girls of the class had begun to 
weep and when Bülent had said that he did not feel like crying the girls had said to 
him: ‘As an alien [Ausländer] you have no idea of what this is all about’ which had 
made Bülent enraged. He told Georgi in the interview: 
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‘I will not accept that. First [...] I was born here. Second: I have a German 
passport. Third: I speak the language perfectly. [...] I do not feel I were an alien 
here. This is my home [Heimat]. I was born here. I am living here. And I am a 
German, too. That is, in a way I am a German but in a way Turkish as well. I 
am both.’ (Georgi 2000, 158–159; translation partly adopted from Loewy 2002, 
13.) 
 
The class mates’ words to Bülent implied two interconnected messages: ‘As you are 
an alien by origin you can neither understand nor share the historical burden which is 
a central and constitutive part of being a German today’, and, ‘Since you do not seem 
to feel more deeply about this, you are unable to understand the historical experience 
at the core of being a German.’ The fellow students perhaps were not fully conscious 
of such implications of their words, but indeed their message can be interpreted (and 
Bülent did interpret it) like this: not being in an ‘appropriately’ mournful mood in his 
comrades’ opinion Bülent was not conducting himself in a way a German would and 
hence he was relegated to the category of ‘aliens’ despite his legal status as a German- 
speaking German citizen.   
 
At one level, the students’ visit at Terezin and their reaction at the thought of the past 
evil and cruelties can be interpreted as a remedial gesture and a symbolic amend. The 
significant point for my argument here is that a particular emotional reaction (shock, 
tears) became invested not only with moral qualities (what is the ‘appropriate’ degree 
of grief and sorrow) but with meanings of ‘proper’ citizenship. Anxiety for the painful 
past stands out as a prerequisite for belonging in the community of ‘Germans’, that is, 
a particular kind of emotional reaction toward a particular historical injustice becomes 
a criterion for membership in the community that is both cultural and political, the 
‘Germans’. The implications for the politics of cultural citizenship are perceptively 
grasped by Hanno Loewy in his comment on the problem of defining membership in 
the German nation by feelings of transgenerational responsibility for the deeds of the 
Nazis: 
  
‘...such a definition of the German nation excludes all those who do not belong 
to the German community of fate because they can’t be confronted with German 
‘disgrace’: Jews, immigrants, refugees. The identification of a ‘German fate’ 
would, paradoxically, be the final victory of the national dream of ethnic 
destiny: defined by what irreversibly happened and not by common values, by 
descent and not by a Constitution, by blood and not by citizenship.’ (Loewy 
2002, 11.) 
 
In a case where transgenerational responsibility for a particular historical injustice is a 
prominent part of the collective identity of a community, those with ‘deficient’ sense 
of such responsibility may become excluded from the community as cultural ‘aliens’. 
The right to feel responsible for the historical injustice is as if reserved to the cultural-
historical collective that is ‘our’ penitent national community. (As an incisive study of 
the dilemma of the immigrant in relation to the ‘German remembrance culture’ see, 
Seidel Arpaci 2006.) 
 
This may sound rather bleak, and I trust institutional historical apologies in the name 
of national communities are mostly not intended exclusionary, yet they have potential 
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for serving such an outcome. The potential may be actualized when responsibility for 
a particular historical wrong is placed on the members of a political community (cf. 
Thompson’s ‘nations’), as usual in institutional apologies, but an individual member 
does not subscribe to such co-responsibility at the level of cultural solidarity that is 
pertinent also in the constitution of political communities. Solidarity toward the 
political institutions of the community and solidarity toward her traditions and 
historical narratives do not necessarily completely follow from each other. This 
dilemma is reality to migrants in particular: also as political citizens of their new 
country of residence, they may not always that much identify with the purportedly 
national cultural traditions of the country, and hence they often may not regarded as 
‘proper’ citizens either.  
 
This dynamics was identified, in ironic tone, also in the public reactions to President 
Kwasniewski’s earlier mentioned apology for the persecution of Polish Jews and, in 
particular, for the massacre of Jews in the town of Jedwabne in 1941. The apology 
contained a passage rather similar to the one used by Prime Minister Lipponen in 
Helsinki in 2000, President Kwasniewski declaring he asked for forgiveness in the 
name of those ‘who believe that it is impossible to be proud of the greatness of Polish 
history without at the same time feeling pain and shame because of the wrongs Poles 
have committed against other people.’ After the apology there was the following joke 
circulating that involved Emmanuel Olisadebe, an African-born soccer hero who had 
got Polish citizenship: ‘ “So when will Olisadebe finally become completely Polish?” 
“When he, too, apologizes for Jedwabne.” ’ (Quoted in, Tymowski 2002, 298, 301.) 
The joke apparently was circulated often by those with more conservative nationalist 
leanings as a protest against The President whose talk can be seen as an effort to 
convey a modern image of Poland to the international audiences (Tymowski 2002). 
However, the conservative nationalists could challenge the apology from the position 
of purportedly ‘true heirs’ of the national tradition, as insiders, thus the stakes in their 
ironic disparaging of the official redressive interpretation of the national past were not 
as high for them as they would have been for someone speaking from the position of a 
newcomer and immigrant.  
 
Situating oneself in the margins by accepting apology 
 
Above I have discussed historical apologies as a vehicle of politics of citizenship. The 
past can be mobilized for politics of citizenship in various ways, some of which bring 
the issue of the ‘right’ intrepretation of the past directly within the realm of judicial or 
legal implications, as for example in citizenship tests or in the so-called memory laws 
(lois de mémoire). I have argued that the rhetorics of shared responsibility we find in 
institutional historical apologies may serve to demarcate the ‘penitent’ community so 
that it excludes cultural ‘aliens’ from the moral community that is constructed in the 
exhortations to ‘our’ nation to recognize her historical obligations. But historical 
apologies may also carry implications that concern the symbolic boundaries of the 
collective that is being apologized to. When an institutional apology is made, 
people have to take a stand whether to identify themselves, culturally and historically, 
with the collective that is being apologized to, and that may pose a dilemma, too. The 
issue can be illustrated with the following examples. 
 
As a visiting lecturer at the Dalarna Polytechnic, Sweden, in spring 2007, I had an 
opportunity to give a seminar on the topic ‘Historical reparations and the politics of 
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cultural citizenship.’ At that time there was some discussion in the Swedish media on 
whether the state should make amends to the people of the county Scania (Skåne), in 
South of Sweden, as an act of reparing historical injustice. Scania was part of the 
Danish Kingdom until Denmark lost the territory in the seventeenth century and it 
was annexed to the Swedish Kingdom. The subsequent policy of unification of the 
conquered territory by the Swedish authorities was brutal and also disastrous to the 
Scanian vernacular culture. As the issue was discussed in our seminar a student with 
Scanian family tree put forth the question if she, in the case a governmental apology 
for the oppression of the Scanian people and culture in the past, should regard herself 
primarily as a citizen of the State of Sweden (‘Swedish’) or as a person to whom the 
Swedes apologize via ‘their’ State (‘Scanian’). The apology would set the potential 
recipient of apology in a dilemma on how to prioritize the competing elements of her 
cultural-historical identity (‘Swede’ – ‘Scanian’) and the meaningful narratives and 
traditions she wishes to be part of. Historical apologies implicitly demand people to 
(re)consider and to decide what position to take in relation to available cultural 
identifications. This may have political dimensions, for example in how one situates 
oneself in the margins or in the centre of the political landscape of the country. 
 
That institutional apologies may have implications for the symbolic demarcation of 
the apologizing community and the community which is being apologized to also 
allows situations where the two effects so to speak operate simultaneously as in the 
following case which, however, is not about a state apology for any distant past. It 
concerns the cartoons with the figure of Prophet Mohammed that were published in 
the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, in 2005. The cartoons, including a picture of 
the Prophet with a turban in bomb-form, caused an outcry in the Moslem communities 
in Denmark and in other countries. The Moslem communities demanded a public 
apology from the newspaper for offending the sensibilities of the Moslems. Flemming 
Rose, editor in the Jyllands-Posten, defended the newspaper and commented on the 
question of apology with the following argument in an article in The Washington 
Post: 
 
‘We [in Denmark] have a tradition of satire when dealing with the royal family 
and other public figures, and that was reflected in the cartoons. The cartoonists 
treated Islam the same way they treat Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and 
other religions. And by treating Muslims in Denmark as equals they made a 
point: We are integrating you into the Danish tradition of satire because you 
are part of our society, not strangers. The cartoons are including, rather than 
excluding Muslims.’ (Rose 2006.) 
 
Rose thus contended that Jyllands-Posten had considered the Moslem community in 
Denmark to be ‘Danish’ enough to understand and to condone also this kind of more 
pungent joking that is, allegedly, characteristic of Danishness. The publication of the 
pictures should therefore be interpreted as a confirmation of Danish Moslems’ status 
as ‘proper’ citizens in Danish society and, more to the point, ‘proper’ members of the 
Danish culture. An apology, to the contrary, would have implied their ‘otherness’ as 
people who have not adopted the Danish cultural norms and codes of public life and 
collective humour and who, therefore, are culturally alien. The argument which Rose 
made may have been an afterward construction, and it clearly has an assimilationist 
flavour, but it is not outright illogical: provided that ‘Danishness’ entails particular 
attitude to humour  and to the acceptable style of political expression there is a logic 
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in maintaining that no ‘real’ Dane would ever fancy demanding an apology for such a 
political cartoon. However a counterargument would be that an institutional apology 
here would recognize the experiences of the Danish Moslems as part of the reality of 
contemporary Danish society and everyday culture, thus encouraging reconsideration 
of the cultural contents of ‘Danishness’ itself. (See, Boe & Hervik 2008.) This is, of 
course, what also lies at the heart of most demands for historical apologies: a request 
to reconsider the story of what ‘we’ have done and whether ‘we’ may have acted 
wrong in the past. 
 
What is at stake in the exclusionary potential of apologies? 
 
In this article I have discussed some, perhaps counterintuitive, implications that 
institutional apologies for historical injustices may have for the politics of cultural 
citizenship. The crux of the argument is that the apologies may have not only 
inclusionary outcomes (which are usually easily visible and also in the focus of the 
very claim for apology) but also exclusionary ones that are less direct and probably 
less intentional, yet not necessarily less powerful for that. My point is that in the 
rhetorics of these apologies there can be demands for solidarity which conflate the 
idea of political and cultural community so that ‘our nation’ as a political community 
becomes equivalent of ‘our nation’ as a historically established cultural community 
whereby also the notion of citizenship is given an ethnic twist: cultural belonging is 
made the core of citizenship. As normative statements on the proper interpretation of 
the past (‘our past’) they contribute to the construction of the symbolic and mental 
boundaries of historical-cultural communities, allowing access in the community to 
some but not others, and those boundaries have in recent years become an issue of 
political controverse in the Western societies as they are facing the questions of 
cultural integration and cohesion all the more directly. (See, Joppke 2007.)  
 
Admittedly I have presented a limited number of examples from countries of which 
Finland and Poland are not traditional immigration countries, and also in Denmark 
and Germany extensive immigration is a more recent phenomenon than in Australia 
or in the UK, for example. The rhetorics of ‘national values’ and the conflation of the 
political and cultural identification in historical apologies however is not absent in 
these countries either, as one may see for example in a speech by Governor General 
Sir William Deane in Australia, in 1996: 
 
‘[A recognition of past injustices against the Aboriginals] is simply to assert our 
identity as a nation and the basic fact that national shame, as well as national 
pride, can and should exist in relation to past acts and omissions, at least when 
done or made in the name of the community or with the authority of government. 
Where there is no room for national pride or national shame about the past, 
there can be no national soul.’ (Quoted in, Celermajer 2006, 177) 
 
As Celermajer notes (2006, 178), resorting to the expression ‘national soul’ seems to 
have been an attempt to grasp the kind of ‘pervasive, underlying ethos’ of solidarity 
that modern political theory has found difficult to deal with. The ramifications of Sir 
William’s rumination for the criteria of membership in the national community seem 
very demanding: being a ‘proper’ Australian is tied up with particular sentiments and 
feelings of sharing a particular historical legacy. However it would be a topic of more 
extensive study to look at the rhetorics of state apologies in different countries more 
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closely so as to see if the rhetorics of ‘ethnic nationalism’ (Stevenson 2003, 44–45) 
and the strategy of conflating the political and the cultural is, as one might assume, a 
more prominent feature in the Continental European apology discourses than, say, in 
the Australian or Canadian discourses.  
 
It would probably be too cynicist to conclude that the rise of institutional apologies 
and other forms of symbolic reparation for historical injustices in Western societies in 
recent decades only reflects an increased concern for demarcating and sustaining the 
symbolic cultural walls of ‘our’ historical communities at the time when those walls 
may appear all the more negotiable or permeable, yet the possibility of such political 
undercurrents in the rhetorics also in this field of politics of history should not be 
immediately discounted. Nowadays the laws on acquiring citizenship will not easily 
be set in terms that can be clearly seen as discriminatory, but more intricate forms of 
exclusion may be found in the cultural constitution of citizenship, for example in the 
expectations of tolerance to particular life-styles as a non sine qua of the citizen (cf. 
Joppke 2007, 44–46; Miller 2002, 234–236). 
 
To round off the discussion, what is at stake in the exclusionary potential of official 
apologies if we consider it in the context of cultural citizenship? First, the conflation 
of the political and the cultural community that may easily take place in the rhetorics 
of institutional apologies, for example in the references to ‘our glorious history’ or 
‘healing our nation’s soul’, may effectively reinforce the notion of citizenship where 
particular cultural-historical identification is the prerequisite of the first-class citizen 
and the ‘true member’ of the civic community. Second, as far as historical apologies 
are as usual conceived of as instances of negotiation between two parties, the victims 
and the perpetrators, those not readily identifying with either of these two categories 
(the ‘third’) are relegated to cultural-political limbo as either inherently incapable of 
entering the national ‘community of memory’ or as obligated to assimilate in it and to 
abandon their particularistic collective memories (see, Seidel Arpaci 2006).  
 
Third, in relation to the latter point in particular, historical apologies may often entail 
an aspect that resembles ‘exclusion through liberalism’ (cf. Joppke 2007; consider 
also the Danish cartoon affair above): repairing to a group of people that has been 
oppressed in the past is congruent with the principles of human rights, but the implicit 
obligation in a state apology for citizens to endorse the redress would place the critics 
of the apology in the category of illiberal antagonists to the modern human rights and 
thus perhaps unworthy of ‘first-class’ citizen’s status. Elazar Barkan has suggested the 
trend of historical reparation can be connected to a political-moral configuration that 
he coins ‘Neo-Enlightenment’ (Barkan 2001). This term captures well the tensions 
inherent in the universalizing, or transcultural, presumptions in historical apologies as 
they make moral judgements on distant pasts, i.e. different cultures. Official apologies 
by state institutions enunciate a normative view on whose memory and interpretation 
of the past are to be endorsed, and I believe that often it can be also well justified with 
historical argumentation. Yet these apologies are also, as politics of history, normative 
statements on what should be incorporated in the shared memory and shared historical 
identity of the decent, responsible citizens’ community that stands behind the speech 
act of apology.  
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Notes 
1. To the Finnish leadership the alliance with Germany was a military rather than an 
ideological one. The Soviet Union had attempted to conquer Finland by invasion in 
1939–40, and though the plan did not succeed Finland lost part of her territory in the 
peace treaty in March 1940. Political pressure from the Soviet on Finland continued, 
however. Fearing the fate of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia which were effectively 
occupied by the SU during summer 1940, the Finnish Government decided to stake on 
Germany when Berlin offered Finland co-operation and a prospect of revanche when 
the anticipated war against Communism would commence. Military co-operation was 
designed in secrecy, and when the war between Germany and the SU broke out in 
June 1941, Finland joined in. 
2. Prime Minister Lipponen’s speech at the memorial for the eight Jewish deported, 
5th November 2000 (in Finnish), 
<www.valtioneuvosto.fi/ajankohtaista/puheet/puhe/fi.jsp?oid=102938> [Accessed 
22.1.2009]. 
3. The apology generated also negative reactions which betrayed that the retrieval of 
the Jewish experience of oppression by the Polish people was seen by some as an 
unwelcome addenda in the narrative of Poland’s history. 
4. Thompson concedes a ‘nation is sometimes said to be a group defined by a culture, 
language or religion [...] but this way of using the term is not relevant to a theory of 
historical obligations and entitlements” as cultural groups can not “pursue policies or 
make and keep promises’ (p. 72). Such non-political collectives may also have been 
‘disadvantaged by their history’; that situation may justify claims for compensation on 
grounds of equity, not for a reparation on grounds of historical obligation (p. 72) 
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